Introduction
February 15 of this year was the 95 th anniversary of the adoption of the Satversme of the Republic of Latvia (hereinafter -the Satversme). 1 The author believes that no one has surpassed the description of the importance of the basic https://doi.org/10.22364/jull. 10.07 law in the history of any nation by Prof. Immanuel Kant. I. Kant held that the constitution (Verfassung) was " […] an act of general will, by which a crowd turns into a nation" 2 . Thus, constitution is the foundation for legal relations of society. 3 As the foundation of social relations, the Satversme, pursuant to the principle of unity of the constitution 4 "[…] is a coherent whole, and norms that it comprises require systemic interpretation" 5 . "Understanding of the Satversme as a coherent whole also means that no contradictions exist between norms of the Satversme and that all norms of the Satversme can be arranged in a harmonious and internal system". 6 "The principle of the Satversme's unity prohibits interpreting some constitutional norms in isolation from other norms of the Satversme, because the Satversme as a united document influences the scope and the content of each particular norm". 7 Democracy governed by the rule of law is inconceivable without a person's right to freedom of speech. However, in human relationships the freedom of speech often means as many opinions as there are persons. Thus, the truth can be born only in dispute, as Socrates, the philosopher of Athens (469-399), 8 fairly noted already in Ancient Greece. Although the valid Satversme must be examined as "a coherent whole", that did not mean that adoption of the Satversme at the Constitutional Assembly proceeded in mute unanimity. On the contrary, a significant number of articles of the Satversme at the time of their adoption by the Constitutional Assembly caused significant discussions and clashes of opposite opinions. On the one hand, this was a proof that the Satversme was adopted in a democratic procedure, on the other hand, it pointed to "weaknesses" in the Satversme. Identification of the "the weaknesses" leads to a better understanding of possible solutions for improving the basic law. Thus, "eternal return" to analysing issues in adoption of the Satversme has not lost its relevance almost 100 years after the basic law entered into force.
The author's goal in the current article is to analyse clashes during "the brainstorm" of the members of the Constitutional Assembly at the time of adopting some articles of the Satversme. In view of the limited scope of this paper, analysis of the drafting of the Satversme will be limited to three aspects, i.e.:
1) the institution of the President of the State; 2) the judicial power; 3) the freedom to strike. 
On the Institution of the President of the State
When the institution of the President was discussed, "swords were crossed" over two matters. Firstly, whether the State of Latvia needed the institute of the President; and, secondly, if it was necessary, who should have the right to elect the President. Although the Leftists could refer to "historical experience" and enjoyed certain support by scholars, their proposal -"The Speaker of the Saeima shall perform the tasks of the President" -was rejected at the Constitutional Assembly with a noteworthy majority of votes. 18 2. Contrary to the Leftists, the Rightists saw a constitutional value in the institution of the President elected by the people: 1) the President elected by the people can prevent parliamentary dictatorship, simultaneously protecting the Saeima against arbitrariness of the executive power (Arveds Bergs, non-party group); 19 2) the President elected by the people will be "[...] a political symbol of unanimity of the Latvian national state" (Jānis Purgals, Union of Christian Democrats); 20 3) the President elected by the people would better sense the people's sentiments and will be able to take a decisive step -dismiss the Saeima. A President elected by the Saeima, on the contrary, will hardly decide to dismiss the Saeima, since "can a servant drive the master out of the house" (Jānis Goldmanis, Farmers' Union); 21 4) will be able to guard democracy against radicals in the Saeima. "[…] the right of the Head of the State in such a case to intervene and dismiss the Parliament, by this he is also given the right to guard the principle of democratism" (Oto Nonācs, non-affiliated deputy).
22
The proposal made by the Rightists -"The President shall be elected by the people for the term of five years in general, equal, direct and secret election" 23 -similarly to the proposal of the Leftists did not gain support of the majority of the Satversmes Sapulce (Constitutional Assembly) members. 24 As opposed to the Leftists, the Rightists lacked only two votes needed to have the people elect the Head of State in Latvia. 25 In a situation, where none of the dominant political forces held the majority, compromise determined everything. 26 A compromise proposal, strange as it may sound, was "brought to the table" by the same O. Nonācs, who had defended the idea of a President elected by the people a short while ago. Thus, the following wording became historical in the second reading of the draft Satversme -"The Saeima shall elect the President for a term of three years". 27 The current Article 35 of the Satversme has the same wording, the only difference being that today the President's term in office has been extended to four years.
28
A certain theoretical substantiation for the rights of the Saeima to elect the President was also found. The same O. Nonācs proposed a thesis regarding the ease of subjecting the people to fraudulent statements, "[t]o the contrary, if the President is elected by the Saeima, then demagogy and dark propaganda will have no place in presidential election".
29
For a long period after the independence of the State of Latvia was restored de facto, this O. Nonācs' claim was quite powerful. It could be used as an excuse for endowing the Saeima and not the people with the duty to elect the President. However, there is only one truth -O. Nonācs' thesis lacks proof. Until now, no one has studied, whether the Saeima or the people are more susceptible toward demagogy. Since the institution of a President elected by the people was rejected, the President elected by the Saeima was not given the sole right to dismiss the legislator. Again, upon O. Nonācs'proposal, the President's right to initiate dismissal of the Saeima in a referendum was supported. 
On the Judicial Power
"The State is a legal order". 31 The legislator has "the first say" in establishing law; however, "the final word" rests with the judicial power. 32 Therefore, a democracy governed by the rule of law is inconceivable without independent judicial power. However, only honest and competent judges are able to consolidate the foundations of a state governed by the rule of law. Regretfully, not all the judges appointed to the office are like that. When Chapter VI of the draft Satversme -The Court -was discussed, the first sentence of Article 84 of the Satversme "Judicial appointments shall be confirmed by the Saeima and they shall be irrevocable" -caused noteworthy debates. 33 The Leftists were categorically against this wording. Thus, social democrat Kārlis Dzelzītis saw in the appointment of judges for life a contradiction with the principle of a democratic state, because "[…] the principle of democracy in general is elected courts". 34 He held that judges should be elected only for a fixed period -six years. That would allow getting rid of incompetent or otherwise unfit members of the judicial power. Good judges could anyway be re-elected into the office for the whole of their lives. 35 Therefore, on behalf of social democrats, Menshevik A. Petrevics persistently asked the Satversmes Sapulce (Constitutional Assembly) to give up the idea of including the principle of judges' irrevocability in the Satversme. was observed that the judges always depended upon the group of voters electing them". 37 Readings of the draft Satversme show that the view on appointment of a judge into office for life was not unequivocal. Thus, for example, F. Cielēns and A. Petrevics, on behalf of the Leftists, submitted a proposal at the third (last) reading of the draft Satversme to elect judges for a set term of six years. The proposal was rejected by 49 votes "for", 45 "against" and 8 "abstaining" votes (votes "against" and "abstaining" made up 53 votes in total). 38 Consequently, appointment of judges to office for life or for a term set in law was decided by the majority of four votes in favour of electing judges for life. Luckily, the Leftists ended as minority. 39 This laid down solid foundations for independence of the judicial power in the Satversme. "The most effective measure to be integrated into the order of the State to ensure firm, fair and objective enforcement of law is irrevocability of judges, insofar as their behaviour is impeccable. This is the greatest barrier against violations and arbitrariness by representatives elected by the people." 40 On 4 May 1990, the Republic of Latvia restored its independence de facto. 41 On 6 July 1993, the Satversme entered into force in full scope. 42 This ensured continuity of the basic principles in functioning of the judicial power. After giving up the "legacy" of the Soviet rule, independent judicial power was restored in Latvia. On 15 December 1992, on the basis of fundamental principles established by the Satversme, judicial system that existed prior to the occupation 43 and international standards, 44 the law "On Judicial Power" was drafted. 45 The first Section of this Law provides -"And independent judicial power exists in the Republic of Latvia, alongside the legislative and the executive power". The significance of independence of the judicial power is clearly characterised by Gvido Zemrībo, the first Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Latvia, which had restored its independence: "In the absence of an independent judicial power, existing alongside the legislative and the executive power, existence of a democratic state governed by the role of law is inconceivable. Therefore Section 1 of the Law [On Judicial Power] underscores that independent judicial power exists in Latvia alongside the legislative and the executive power." 46 After independence of the state was restored, electability of judges for life and, thus, independence of the judicial power have not been contested.
On the Freedom to Strike
Similarly to the range of issues examined above, the issue of the freedom to strike caused clashes between the opinions of the Leftists and the Rightists.
The Leftists supported the freedom to strike as workers' tool in fighting employers. They, however, were not satisfied with the narrow scope of the freedom to strike established in the Satversme -"Strike is a legal means of economic fight". . 49 This would mean that strike would be a legal means of economic and political fight. It was supported by the independent workers' representative Vilis Dermanis. " […] in a modern state, be it as democratic as it will, the state power, through its executive power, time and again takes the side of employers, not that of workers, and therefore laws, which are democratic, are often interpreted not to the advantage of workers, but for something else." 50 The Rightists, s opposed to the Leftsts, had a negative attitude towards enshrining the freedom to strike in the Satversme. Farmers' parties showed a particularly strong resistance. 51 J. Purgals revealed the true antipathies of the Rightists towards the right to freedom of strike: "All these freedoms, rights, all political demands to a large extent are borrowed from the German Constitution.
[And yet] there is nothing in the German Constitution about the freedom to strike having been recognised in Germany."
53 Why? Because in Germany communists, helped by independent socialists, organised an impressive number of strikes in the name of economic demands, but with the aim of seizing political power. The leader of social democrats President Friedrich Ebert and Prime Minister Philipp Scheidemann had to turn to workers and ask them not to strike to prevent "the Reds" from coming into power.
Thus, "[…] a strike is needed only by those, who organise strikes pretending to aim at improving economic conditions, but in fact intend to take political dictatorship in their own hands." 54 Communists' true intentions are seen in the Soviet Russia. "There the communist government has put all workers under the conditions of slaves." 55 Understanding that the majority of the Constitutional Assembly did not want to support the idea of freedom to strike, part of the Leftists mitigated their position and no longer demanded a strike as a political means of fight. 56 In this stance they were supported also by some politicians of the Rightist parties. In order not to give up the freedom of strike as a basic human right, 57 A. Bergs proposed a compromise of "utmost necessity": "A strike is a legal means of economic fight. The freedom to strike may be restricted on the basis of a special law. A strike in enterprises of public necessity shall be punishable". 58 A. Bergs' proposal, regrettably, was not supported. 59 "The spectre of communism" had done its job. The majority of deputies voted against anything that could be even seemingly linked to communism. 60 It can be assumed that the negative vote was "reinforced" also by A. Purgals' conclusion that "[…] it is extremely difficult to draw a line between an economic and a political strike" 61 and the statement made by Mārtiņš Antons from labour party that "[…] the best economic conditions cannot be attained by a political strike, but by parliamentary government, parliamentary majority, and legislation." 62 During the years of totalitarian Soviet power, the right to strike was not relevant. The situation changed after de facto restoration of the state's independence. After Declaration of Independence of 4 May 1990 was proclaimed, a large number of laws guaranteeing human rights were adopted, for example, "Law on Religious Organizations", "Law on the Press and Other Mass Media", the constitutional law "Rights and Duties of People and Citizens", etc. 63 On 15 October 1998, significant amendments were introduced also to the Satversme. 64 Such rights as the right to peaceful assemblies, street processions and pickets, as well as the freedom to strike were included in the Chapter on fundamental human rights.
Summary
1. The right of the Saeima to elect the President, enshrined in the Satversme, is a political compromise, ensured by a small majority of vote. The compromise meant that the institution of the President was included in the Satversme; however, the people were denied the right to elect President. 2. Election of judges for life and not for the term of six years was decided by a majority of only four votes in favour of electing judges for life. Although not convincingly, nevertheless, a solid foundation was laid for independence of the judicial power in the Republic of Latvia with a small majority of vote. 3. Negative attitude of the majority of the Saeima members toward including the freedom to strike in the original wording of the Saeima was politically motivated and not legally substantiated. There were concerns that communists could use the freedom to strike in their own interests with the aim of establishing communist dictatorship.
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